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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Injustice Revisited: Did Ivan the Terrible
Get Away Again?
I. INTRODUCTION
"The annihilation of six million Jews, carried out by the
German state under Adolf Hitler during World War II, has
resisted understanding."' Guards at extermination camps shot
babies, the elderly, and those unable to walk to their deaths, and
forced thousands of people into gas chambers. Who would
become one of these guards?
In 1975, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"),
the agency responsible for enforcing U.S. immigration law,
received a list of suspected Ukrainian Nazi collaborators at large
in the United States.2 In 1976, John Demjanjuk was identified for
the first time as "Ivan the Terrible," the man who operated the gas
chambers in Treblinka, a Nazi death camp located fifty miles from
Warsaw.3 Demjanjuk's name was on this list, as he was sought for
having allegedly: (1) trained in Trawniki, Poland, a facility that
trained Nazi camp guards to systematically murder Jews in the
extermination camps; (2) served as a Wachmann ("Guardsman")
with the German Schutzstaffel ("SS") in the town of Sobibor,4 an
extermination camp located one hundred miles south of Treblinka;
(3) served as a guardsman in the concentration camp town of
1. LucY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945, at xxxv (1975).
2. TOM TEICHOLZ, THE TRIAL OF IVAN THE TERRIBLE: STATE OF ISRAEL VS. JOHN
DEMJANJUK 26 (1990).
3. DAWIDOWlCZ, supra note 1, at 135-49. Treblinka was an extermination camp
where Germans killed over 850,000 Jews between July, 1942 and September, 1943. The
victims reached the extermination camp by train and were separated once they arrived,
with men sent to the right, and women and children sent to the left. Their belongings
were immediately taken from them, and they were forced to undress. The naked mass of
humanity was then herded into gas chambers. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 8.
4. Construction of Sobibor, another death camp, began in March 1942. Over 250,000
Jews died there. DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 1, at 149.
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Flossenbuerg, Germany; and (4) participated in the mass execu-
tions of the Jewish population in Sobibor.5
Although the Israeli Supreme Court found reasonable doubt
regarding Demjanjuk's identity as the infamous "Ivan the Terrible"
of Treblinka, the Court nonetheless found substantial evidence
that Demjanjuk was a Nazi collaborator who served in other death
camps, including Sobibor.6 "For the prosecution, the problem was
not lack of evidence but the overwhelming amount of it."7 Such
evidence includes a photo identification card, a German registry of
camp guards, and eyewitness testimony. Consequently, the
decision to allow Demjanjuk-back into the United States after his
acquittal has angered many people.
Following a discussion of the historical background leading up
to Demjanjuk's trial in Israel, this Comment will first examine the
Displaced Persons Act and the prosecution of Nazi war criminals
in the United States. This Comment will then examine
Demjanjuk's denaturalization and deportation proceedings in the
United States. This Comment will then consider the extradition of
Demjanjuk from the United States to Israel and the issues that
were raised by this request. These issues fall into the broad
categories of (1) Double Criminality, (2) Universal Jurisdiction,
and (3) Doctrine of Specialty. This Comment will then examine
Demjanjuk's trial in Israel, comparing how the United States
would have treated newly discovered evidence, which resulted in
Demjanjuk's acquittal in Israel. Finally, this Comment will address
the implications of Demjanjuk's return to the United States on the
U.S. role in subsequent prosecutions of alleged Nazi war criminals.
A. Background
Demjanjuk, a native of the Ukraine, was accused of murder-
ing thousands of Jews and others at the Treblinka death camp in
Poland during World War II, where he was known to inmates as
"Ivan the Terrible."'8 In 1952, under the Displaced Persons Act
of 1948 ("DPA"),9 Demjanjuk entered the United States; he
5. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 27.
6. Ken Myers, Under the Demjanjuk Spotlight, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at 1.
7. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 88.
8. Id. at 1.
9. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948) (as
amended by Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950)).
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became a naturalized citizen in 1958.0 On February 27, 1986,
Demjanjuk was flown to Israel to stand trial for committing crimes
against humanity during World War I.'
In 1977, twenty-five years after his arrival in the United
States, the U.S. Government charged Demjanjuk with the illegal
procurement of citizenship. Specifically, the U.S. Government
charged that Demjanjuk failed to disclose on his citizenship
application that he was a Ukrainian who had fought in the Russian
army, and served in the German SS at Trawniki, Poland, and at
the Treblinka and Sobibor death camps.12 The U.S. Government
claimed that Demjanjuk's activities during the war excluded him
from the DPA's definition of an "eligible displaced person.,
13
The U.S. Government also maintained that Demjanjuk's visa was
invalid because he illegally procured his certificate of natural-
ization and the order admitting him into the United States through
willful misrepresentation of material facts.
14
On February 10, 1981, the Demjanjuk case went to trial in the
Northern District Court of Ohio before Chief Judge Frank
Battisti.15 At trial, the court found that Demjanjuk had misstated
his place of residence from 1937 to 1948, and that he had failed to
admit serving as an SS guard and soldier in a German military unit
on his application for naturalization. 6 In response, Demjanjuk
claimed that he was a farmer in Poland until 1943 and then
worked in Danzig and Munich until the end of the war.
17
On June 23, 1981, Judge Battisti held that Demjanjuk had
illegally procured his naturalization by concealing his service as a
German SS guard at Trawniki and Treblinka, and that he subse-
quently made willful misrepresentations.18  The court revoked
Demjanjuk's certificate of naturalization and vacated the order
granting him United States citizenship. 9 Within eighteen months,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
10. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1981), affd, 680
F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
11. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 77.
12. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1363.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1363-71.
16. Id.
17. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1379.
18. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 69.
19. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1362.
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decision denaturalizing Demjanjuk,2 and the U.S. Supreme Court
denied Demjanjuk's petition for certiorari. 1
Demjanjuk, his family, and his supporters never considered
that Israel would request his extradition.22 They believed that,
because his identification was based on suspect Soviet-supplied
evidence, the Soviet Union would deport him.2  On April 11,
1983, Demjanjuk's deportation hearing began, based on
Demjanjuk's illegal presence in the United States.24 On October
31, 1983, while the deportation proceeding was before the
immigration court, Israel requested the extradition of
Demjanjuk' and asked the United States to issue a warrant for
his arrest for murder.26 By posting a $50,000 bond, secured by
the deed to his home, Demjanjuk remained free.27
The extradition proceeding did not begin until the United
States finished the ensuing deportation hearing. On April 15,
1985, following eighteen months of litigation, U.S. District Court
Judge Frank Battisti ruled in favor of Demjanjuk's extradition to
Israel. 8 On October 31, 1985, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed this order.2 9 On February 24, 1986, the
Supreme Court once again denied Demjanjuk's petition for
certiorari.'
After legal remedies were exhausted, the authorities moved
Demjanjuk to the Metropolitan Correctional Center on Park Row
in New York City, where he prepared for departure.1 On
February 27, 1986, Demjanjuk made a last-minute appeal to the
Attorney General, which was rejected.32 On the same day, the
State Department authorized Demjanjuk's extradition, and
Demjanjuk arrived in Israel on February 28, 1986.33 Israel
20. United States v. Dernjanjuk, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036
(1982).
21. Demjanjuk v. United States, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
22. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 73.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 74.
25. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1463, 1464 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
26. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 74.
27. Id.
28. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 571 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
29. Dernjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 1985).
30. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
31. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 77.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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charged Demjanjuk with crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
crimes against the Jewish people under the Nazi and Nazi
Collaborators Law.' He was also charged with murder under the
penal code of the State of Israel.35
The request to extradite Demjanjuk marked Israel's first
formal request for extradition of a suspected Nazi war criminal
from the United States.36 Moreover, Demjanjuk's trial was the
first trial of a Nazi war criminal in Israel since the trial of Adolf
Eichmann in 1961."7 While Eichmann was tried as the "master
planner" of the extermination of the Jews, Demjanjuk was accused
of being one of the most sadistic murderers of the Jews as the
alleged operator of the gas chambers at the Treblinka death
camp.3' Demjanjuk's trial in Israel has set the stage for addition-
al proceedings involving not only the United States, but also other
countries that have extradition treaties with Israel.39 Israel's
request "appears to be a test case that could determine whether
Israel pursues other suspects. This creates the opportunity for at
least a tacit admission of Israel's special position with regard to
war crimes against Jews anywhere in the world."'' 4
B. The Displaced Persons Act
In 1948, Congress enacted the Displaced Persons Act to
enable millions of European refugees, many of whom were
survivors of Nazi concentration camps or people driven from their
homelands, to emigrate to the United States.41 The DPA prohib-
34. Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, Aug. 1, 1950, 4 Laws St. Isr. No.
64, at 154. "This particular legislation is totally different from any other legislation usual
in criminal codes . . . and the reason for its difference lies in the nature of the crimes it
deals with." See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM, A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL 254 (1963).
35. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 88.
36. Ian Black, Ivan: A Case of Trial and Error, GUARDIAN, July 30, 1993, at 2.
37. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 4. For an in-depth discussion of Adolph Eichmann's
trial in Jerusalem, see ARENDT, supra note 34, at 36.
38. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 4.
39. Israel has extradition treaties with Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Steven Lubet & Jan Stem Reed, Extradition of Nazis
from the United States to Israel: A Survey of Issues in Transnational Criminal Law, 22
STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1986).
40. Yoram Kessel, Israel, in a Test Case, Seeks To Extradite Suspected Nazi War
Criminal from U.S., WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1983, at 16.
41. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1378 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
1994]
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ited the entry into the United States of any person "who advocat-
ed or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race,
religion, or national origin."42  Nevertheless, many Nazi war
criminals entered the United States under this special immigration
law by lying about their activities during the period from 1933 to
1945. Nazi war criminals also entered the United States under
other immigration laws that did not specifically exclude persons
who assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians.43 On March 28,
1979, the Justice Department formed the Office of Special
Investigations ("OSI") within its Criminal Division to locate,
investigate, and institute legal proceedings against Nazi war
criminals in the United States."
C. Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals
Criminal proceedings cannot be brought against Nazi criminals
in the United States.45 Because the Nazi crimes did not take
place in the United States, the United States does not have federal
criminal jurisdiction over Nazi cases.' Two types of proceedings
may be brought against Nazi criminals in the United States: (1)
deportation and denaturalization proceedings pursuant to U.S.
immigration law and (2) extradition.47 A proceeding under immi-
gration law is a two-step process involving denaturalization
(revocation of citizenship) and deportation (expulsion from the
United States).' Although denaturalization and deportation
proceedings are both governed by immigration law, they are
42. Displaced Persons Act § 13.
43. Jeffrey N. Mausner, Apprehending and Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in the
United States, 15 NOVA L. REV. 747, 764 (1991).
44. Id. at 751. The OSI is still prosecuting Nazi criminals residing in the United States.
Id.
45. Id. at 761.
46. Id. In other words, no statutory basis exists under current U.S. law for the
assertion of federal criminal jurisdiction over Nazi cases, especially because the crimes
were committed beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. Any attempt to
amend the federal criminal code to include such cases would conflict with the Constitu-
tion's proscription against ex post facto legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Office
of Special Investigations' only recourse has been to institute denaturalization proceedings
against suspected war criminals who have acquired U.S. citizenship and, if successful,
institute separate deportation proceedings against them. If the individual never became
a naturalized U.S. citizen, the government may proceed with deportation proceedings.
TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 313.
47. Mausner, supra note 43, at 761.
48. Id.
[Vol. 16:953958
1994] Injustice Revisited 959
distinct actions. In addition, deportation proceedings cannot begin
until denaturalization proceedings and all appeals have been
concluded.49
The second type of proceeding that may be brought against a
Nazi criminal is extradition." Extradition may occur only if it is
established that (1) a valid treaty is in effect between the surren-
dering and requesting countries; (2) the person before the court is
the same individual who is charged in the requesting country; and
(3) the acts charged constitute an extraditable offense.51 The
government of the foreign country must also ask the U.S. Govern-
ment to send the person to the foreign country to stand trial for
crimes allegedly committed in that country or under that country's
jurisdiction.52 In an extradition proceeding, the court determines
only whether there is a sufficient legal basis to warrant the return
of the fugitive to the requesting country; the Secretary of State
makes the ultimate decision regarding extradition.53
II. DEMJANJUK'S IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
A. Denaturalization
In 1981, the U.S. Government brought an action in federal
district court under section 1451(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA") of 1952' to revoke Demjanjuk's certifi-
cate of naturalization and to vacate the order admitting him into
the United States.55 The denaturalization trial took fourteen days
during February and March of 1981. The government's case
consisted of four broad themes: (1) the history of Operation
Reinhard,56 (2) the Trawniki identification card, (3) Treblinka
eyewitness identifications, and (4) Demjanjuk's immigration. The
district court determined that Demjanjuk's illegally procured
49. Id.
50. Id. at 769.
51. Lubet & Reed, supra note 39, at 6.
52. Mausner, supra note 43, at 769.
53. Lubet & Reed, supra note 39, at 6.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1986).
55. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
56. RESPONSE: THE WIESENTHAL CENTER REPORT No. 3, DEMJANJUK RETURNS TO
U.S.-CENTER PETITIONS CLINTON, RENO 11 (1993-94) [hereinafter RESPONSE].
"Operation Reinhard" was the plan to annihilate Polish Jewry at the concentration camps
of Treblinka, Belzec, and Sobibor. I&. at 12.
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certificate of naturalization had to be canceled.57 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denaturalization decision,
and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Demjanjuk's petition for
certiorari."8
In 1939, Demjanjuk lived in Dub Macharenzi, where he
worked as a collective farmer and as a tractor driver.59 In 1940,
Demjanjuk was conscripted into the Russian army.' On June 22,
1941, Germany invaded the U.S.S.R. and, in 1942, the German
Army captured Demjanjuk.61  The Soviet prisoners of war
("POWs") were then moved to German POW camps, including
Rovno, in the Western Ukraine, and Chelm, Poland.62
Demjanjuk testified that, although he did not remember the exact
dates of this translocation, he was in Rovno from 1942 to 1943 and
in Chelm until 1943 or 1944.63 The U.S. Government believed
that Demjanjuk was next transferred to the SS training camp in
Trawniki and was sent from there to Treblinka, Poland, where he
allegedly assisted' in the persecution and extermination of the
concentration camp victims.6"
Throughout the trial, Demjanjuk contended that the
Trawniki document was not authentic, and suggested the possibility
of forgery.65 In addition to offering the Trawniki document as
evidence of Demjanjuk's occupation as an SS guard, the Govern-
ment offered the testimony of surviving Jewish prisoners from
Treblinka. The prisoners identified Demjanjuk as "Ivan the
Terrible," the man who actually ran the gas chambers at Treblinka,
where hundreds of thousands of civilians were murdered. 66 The
Government also produced the videotaped testimony of Otto
Horn, a German guard at Treblinka who identified Demjanjuk's
Trawniki photo as Ivan.67
57. Demjanjuk, 518 F.Supp. at 1386.
58. United States v. Demjanjuk, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036
(1982).
59. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1365.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1363.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1362.
65. Id. at 1366. At no time during the trial, however, was any evidence introduced to
substantiate this claim. Id.
66. Id. at 1369.
67. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 111.
960 [Vol. 16:953
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Demjanjuk denied ever serving the Germans as a guard at
Trawniki, Treblinka, or any other location between 1942 and
1943.' He testified that after being captured by the Germans in
the Crimea, he was taken first to a POW camp at Rovno and then
to a POW camp at Chelm, Poland, and remained there until 1943
or 1944.69 Demjanjuk testified that he was then taken to Graz,
Austria and, after three to four weeks, transferred to a location
known to him as Oelberg, Austria. 0 Demjanjuk also testified
that he was placed by the Germans in a Russian National Army
unit assigned to guard a captured Russian general, and he claimed
that, aside from this duty, he did not engage in any other military
action.71
In 1948, Demjanjuk initiated procedures to immigrate to the
United States.72 In his application, Demjanjuk neither disclosed
his service with the German SS at Trawniki and Treblinka, nor
revealed, as he testified at trial, that he had served in a German
military unit in 1944 and 1945." 3 In October 1950, Demjanjuk
made these same misrepresentations when he applied to the
Displaced Persons Commission for consideration to immigrate to
the United States.74 In his application, Demjanjuk stated that he
had been a farmer at Sobibor, Poland from 1936 to 1943; worked
at the harbor of Danzig, Germany from 1943 until May 1944; and
worked in Munich, Germany from May 1944 to May 1945."5 In
his application for an immigration visa, Demjanjuk made similar
misrepresentations. 7 6  Demjanjuk testified that he made these
misrepresentations during the immigration proceedings to avoid
being repatriated to the U.S.S.R. because of his prior service in the
Russian army.77 On February 9, 1952, Demjanjuk was granted a
visa and entered the United States for legal residence.78
68. Id. at 1376.
69. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1376.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1376.
72. Id. at 1379.
73. Id.
74. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1376.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1379.
77. Id.
78. Id.
19941
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
In 1958, Demjanjuk applied to the INS for naturalization as
a U.S. citizen.79 On November 14, 1958, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio, without knowledge of
Demjanjuk's true activities and whereabouts during the war,
naturalized Demjanjuk.
Section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
provides that a naturalized citizen may be denaturalized if the
naturalization was "illegally procured" or "procured by conceal-
ment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. '"81 In the
denaturalization proceeding brought against Demjanjuk, the
district court viewed Fedorenko v. United States' as dispositive of
the issue of whether Demjanjuk illegally procured his visa and his
citizenship.83 In Fedorenko, an admitted guard for the German
SS at both Trawniki and Treblinka concealed this information
from immigration officials and obtained a visa.' The Supreme
Court held that Fedorenko's failure to reveal his service as an
armed guard at Treblinka made him ineligible as a matter of law
for a visa under the DPA.
Section 10 of the DPA provides that "any person who shall
willfully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining
admission into the United States as an eligible displaced person
shall thereafter not be admissible into the United States." 86 This
provision applies to willful misrepresentations concerning material
facts. A misrepresentation is considered material if "disclosure of
the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a
visa. " The Court concluded that Fedorenko's failure to reveal
his past service as an armed guard at Treblinka was material under
section 2(b) of the DPA because Service as a concentration camp
guard would have prevented anyone from obtaining a visa.'
In Demjanjuk's 1981 trial, the district court found that the
Government had shown by clear and convincing evidence that
Demjanjuk served in the German SS as a guard at both Trawniki
79. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1380.
80. Id.
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1986).
82. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
83. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1381.
84. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490.
85. Id.
86. Displaced Persons Act § 10.
87. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 509.
88. Id.
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and Treblinka from 1942 to 1943 and willfully misrepresented this
service on his visa application for the purpose of gaining benefits
under the immigration and naturalization laws. 9  Harold
Henrikson, the vice-consul responsible for processing Demjanjuk's
visa application, testified:
If an applicant had told him either (1) that he had served in a
training camp such as Trawniki run by the German SS for the
purpose of training guards for duties at extermination camps or
(2) that he had served as a guard at an extermination camp,
[he] would have denied such individual a visa under the
DPA.9°
Therefore, had Demjanjuk's wartime activities been known, his
petition for naturalization would have been denied.91 In light of
Demjanjuk's testimony and the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
Fedorenko, the district court found that Demjanjuk's failure to
disclose his service under the German SS at Trawniki and his later
service as an armed guard at Treblinka were material misrepresen-
tations under sections 2(b) and 10 of the DPA, which made him
an ineligible displaced person.92 Since Demjanjuk was ineligible
for a visa under the DPA, his citizenship had to be revoked
because he failed to satisfy a statutory prerequisite of naturaliza-
tion.93
The district court also found that Demjanjuk's certificate of
naturalization had to be canceled as it was procured by "conceal-
ment of a material fact or by wilful misrepresentation."' Section
1451(a) of the INA provides for the denaturalization of citizenship
based on: (1) proof of a material misrepresentation in the course
of procuring citizenship, or (2) proof that citizenship was illegally
procured.95 Proof of either of these grounds must be by "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence" that does "not leave the
issue in doubt."96 This burden is "substantially identical with that
89. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1381.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1382.
93. Id.
94. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1383.
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1986).
96. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1981). "Any less exacting
standard would be inconsistent with the importance of the right that is at stake in a
denaturalization proceeding." Id.
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required in criminal cases-proof beyond a reasonable doubt."97
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this provision contains four
requirements: (1) the naturalized citizens must have misrepresent-
ed or concealed some fact; (2) the misrepresentation or conceal-
ment must have been willful; (3) the fact must have been material;
and (4) the naturalized citizen must have procured citizenship as
a result of the misrepresentation or concealment.9"
The Supreme Court defined "materiality" under section
1451(a) of the INA in Chaunt v. United States.99 In Chaunt, the
Court stated that to prove misrepresentation or concealment of a
material fact, the Government must prove by clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence that either: (1) the suppression of facts,
if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship, or (2) the
disclosure of suppressed facts might have been useful in an
investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts
warranting a denial of citizenship." In this case, the Govern-
ment charged that Chaunt had procured his citizenship by
concealing and misrepresenting his record of arrests in the United
States in his application for citizenship and that the arrest record
was a "material" fact within the meaning of the denaturalization
statutes.10 1 The Supreme Court concluded that the nature of his
arrests, the crimes charged, and the disposition of the cases did not
amount to clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that
naturalization was illegally procured within the meaning of section
340(a) of the INA."° The Chaunt Court held that the materiali-
ty standard under section 340(a) pertained to false statements in
applications for citizenship and that it did not apply to Chaunt
because the arrests that he failed to disclose took place after he
came to the United States. Chaunt's situation, unlike Demjanjuk's,
97. United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 73 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
98. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 767 (1988); see also United States v.
Schellong, 547 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd, 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1007 (1984). In Schellong, the defendant lied on his citizenship application about
his service as a concentration camp guard. He was denaturalized based on this
misrepresentation. Id. at 574-75.
99. 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 350.
102. Id. at 351. Section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 requires
revocation of U.S. citizenship that was "illegally procured or ... procured by concealment
of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1986).
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presented no question concerning the lawfulness of his initial entry
into the United States.t°3
An applicant must answer questions about his or her past in
order to become a U.S. citizen. In Demjanjuk's application for
citizenship, question 23 asked whether Demjanjuk had given false
testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under the
immigration and nationality laws. By denying that he had ever
given false testimony to obtain his visa, Demjanjuk suppressed
facts relating to his activities during the war which, if known,
would have warranted denial of his petition for naturalization."
The district court determined that Demjanjuk's certificate of
naturalization must be revoked because it was procured by willful
misrepresentation of material facts."°  The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the denaturalization decision, and the
Supreme Court denied Demjanjuk's petition for certiorari."°
B. Deportation
Any person who assisted the Nazis in persecution and then
entered the United States under the DPA is deportable."°
Nevertheless, a number of Nazi criminals entered the United
States under other immigration laws that did not specifically
prohibit immigration by persons who aided Nazis. As a result, the
INA was amended to require the deportation of all persons who
assisted in the persecution of civilians, regardless of the immigra-
tion law governing entrance into the United States."°
103. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1383.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. United States v. Demjanjuk, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036
(1982).
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1989).
108. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1989).
This amendment is known as the "Holtzman Amendment" and provides for the
deportation of any person who, during the period beginning on March 23, 1933,
and ending on May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with: the
Nazi Government of Germany; any government in any area occupied by the
military forces of the Nazi Government of Germany; any government established
with the cooperation of the Nazi Government of Germany; or, any government
which was an ally of the Nazi Government of Germany, ordered, incited, assisted,
or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race,
religion, national origin, or political opinion. A person who is found deportable
under the Holtzman Amendment for assisting Nazis in persecuting civilians must
be deported.
Mausner, supra note 43, at 764-65.
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On December 6, 1982, the INS began deportation proceedings
against Demjanjuk based on his illegal presence in the country.
While the deportation proceeding was pending before the
Immigration Court, Israel filed an extradition request.1"9
III. DEMJANJUK'S EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS
The ability of any foreign country to request the extradition
of a fugitive from the United States, and the responsibility of the
United States to surrender the fugitive, depends on the existence
of an extradition treaty between the United States and the
requesting nation.110  Israel sought Demjanjuk's extradition
pursuant to the treaty signed by the United States and Israel on
December 10, 1962, which became effective on December 5,
1963.1 In Israel's complaint, the charge of murdering Jews was
equated with specific criminal offenses enumerated in the treaty:
murder, malicious wounding, and infliction of grievous bodily
harm."2
The pertinent portions of the treaty between the United States
and Israel, found in the first three articles, are as follows:
Article I
Each Contracting Party agrees, under the conditions and
circumstances established by the present Convention, reciprocal-
ly to deliver up persons found in its territory who have been
charged with or convicted of any of the offenses mentioned in
Article II of the present Convention committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the other, or outside thereof under the
conditions specified in Article III of the present Convention.
Article II
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of the
present Convention for the prosecution when they have been
charged with, or to undergo sentence when they have been
convicted of, any of the following offenses:
1. Murder.
2. Manslaughter.
3. Malicious wounding; inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Article III
109. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
110. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
111. Convention of Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr. arts. I-III, 14 U.S.T. 1717. The
request for Demjanjuk's extradition was the first ever filed by Israel to extradite a Nazi
war criminal from the United States. See Ian Black, supra note 36, at 2.
112. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 1985).
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When the offense has been committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of a requesting Party, extradition need not be
granted unless the laws of the requested Party provide for the
punishment of such an offense committed in similar circum-
stances.
The words "territorial jurisdiction" as used in this Article
and in Article I of the present Convention mean: territory,
including territorial waters, and the airspace thereover belong-
ing to or under the control of one of the Contracting Parties,
and vessels and aircraft belonging to one of the Contracting
Parties or to a citizen corporation thereof when such vessel is
on the high seas or such aircraft is over the high seas."3
In 1950, the Israeli Parliament, known as the Knesset, passed
the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law, which granted Israel
universal jurisdiction to try war crimes and crimes against humani-
ty.114 The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law makes certain
crimes against the Jewish people and against humanity, and war
crimes committed during the Nazi period, criminal acts punishable
under Israeli law.115 By passing the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators
Law, the Knesset affirmed both Israel's commitment to the
prosecution of the perpetrators of the Holocaust and its moral
authority to stand in judgment of them.
In December 1946, the United Nations General Assembly
("U.N.") recognized the laws of the international court of
Nuremberg concerning war crimes and the concept of crimes
against humanity. 16 The U.N. also affirmed that genocide was
a crime punishable by international law.'17 The Knesset adopted
and incorporated the Charter of the Nuremberg trial into the Nazi
and Nazi Collaborators Law of 1950.118 At the time of the
Eichmann trial, the Israeli Supreme Court upheld the right of
Israel to enact such a law and to try criminals under this law, even
though it was enacted after the Holocaust, as it was in accordance
with the law of nations and international law. 9
113. Convention of Extradition, supra note 111, at arts. I-III.
114. Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, Aug. 1, 1950, 4 Laws St. Isr. No.
64, at 154.
115. Id.
116. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 101.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L L. REP. 277 (S. Ct. Isr. 1962), reprinted
in 2 FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR 1657-87 (1972).
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Israel described Demjanjuk's offenses under the Nazi and
Nazi Collaborators Law in the extradition request, which specifical-
ly charged that Demjanjuk:
murdered tens of thousands of Jews, as well as non-Jews, killing
them, injuring them, causing them serious bodily and mental
harm and subjected them to living conditions calculated to bring
about their physical destruction. The suspect committed these
acts with the intention of destroying the Jewish people and to
commit crimes against humanity.12
In the extradition proceedings, the Israeli government had to
establish that there was probable cause to believe that the person
demanded pursuant to the treaty was the person before the court.
The Israeli government satisfied its burden of identification in two
ways: (1) independent eyewitness identifications of Demjanjuk as
"Ivan the Terrible;" and (2) the "Trawniki card" that had a picture
identification of Demjanjuk and stated that he was employed as a
guard in the SS. Based on this evidence, the district court found
probable cause to believe that Demjanjuk was "Ivan the Terrible."
The court held that the positive identification of Demjanjuk by
Treblinka survivors and the Trawniki card established positive
identification."' This low threshold standard of identification
enabled the Israeli government to meet its burden of showing
probable cause.
A. Double Criminality
Demjanjuk contended that the district court's finding of
jurisdiction to consider Israel's request for extradition violates the
requirement of "double criminality" in international extradition
cases.12  Demjanjuk maintained that the crime he was charged
with was not included in the list of offenses set out in the extradi-
tion treaty.'23 He argued that, because the crime of "murdering
tens of thousands of Jews and non-Jews" was not a specific crime
in the United States, the extradition request should be denied. 4
A fundamental requirement of international extradition is that
120. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
121. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 554.
122. Francine Strauss, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky: An Analysis of Extradition, 12 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 65, 71 n.34 (1987).
123. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (1985).
124. Id. at 576.
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the crime for which extradition is sought is one included in the
treaty between the requesting and the surrendering nations."
Section 487(c) of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States provides that extradition of an accused offender is
not allowed "if the offense with which he is charged or of which
he has been convicted is not punishable as a serious crime both in
the requesting and in the requested state."'26
The court of appeals found that the double criminality
requirement was met in this case, based on the principle set out in
Collins v. Loisel.2 7 In Collins, the petitioner contended that the
crime of cheating, the charge by the requesting state, was dissimi-
lar to the crime of obtaining property under false pretenses, the
charge in the surrendering state, and, therefore, the extradition
was improper. The U.S. Supreme Court held that an offense is
extraditable only if the acts charged are criminal according to the
law of both countries.'2 As the Court stated in Collins:
The law does not require that the name by which the crime is
described in the two countries shall be the same; nor that the
scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects,
the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act
charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.129
Relying on the principle set out in Collins, the Demjanjuk
court held that if the acts upon which charges of the requesting
country are based are also proscribed by a law of the surrendering
nation, the requirement of double criminality is satisfied.' The
court held that the test for double criminality required the same
act, not the specific crime.' Demjanjuk's charge of unlawfully
killing one or more persons is equivalent to an act of murder. The
fact that there is not a separate offense for mass murder or murder
of tens of thousands of Jews in the United States is irrelevant.
125. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Fernandez v.
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
126. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 487(c)
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1984) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW].
127. 259 U.S. 309, 311 (1992).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 312.
130. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 580.
131. Id.
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Thus, the court denied Demjanjuk's claim of lack of double
criminality.
132
B. Universal Jurisdiction
U.S. international extradition powers are governed by 18
U.S.C. § 3184 which requires the extradition complaint to charge
the person sought to be extradited with having committed crimes
"within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government.' 131
Demjanjuk asserted that because he was neither a citizen or a
resident of Israel, because the alleged crimes were committed in
Poland, and because the acts charged occurred before the State of
Israel came into existence, Israel lacked jurisdiction to try him for
the alleged offenses." The question before the Demjanjuk court
was whether murdering Jews in a Nazi extermination camp in
Poland during the period of 1939 through 1945 could be consid-
ered crimes within the jurisdiction of the State of Israel.
Article III of the extradition treaty between the United States
and Israel states that, when an offense has been committed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting party, "extradition need
not be granted unless the laws of the requested party provide for
the punishment of such an offense committed in similar circum-
stances." '135 Demjanjuk contended that the "need not" language
of Article III prohibits an exercise of discretion in the extradition
for any offense for which the laws of the United States provide no
punishment under similar circumstances." 6 He maintained that,
with the demise of the International Military Tribunals ("IMT"),
which tried major Nazi officials at Nuremberg, no courts have
jurisdiction over alleged war crimes.
The United States recognizes a number of international law
principles including "universal jurisdiction" over certain offens-
es.137  This principle allows a state to exercise jurisdiction to
define and punish certain offenses that are of universal concern
132. Id.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
134. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 580.
135. Convention of Extradition, supra note 111, at art. III.
136. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 580-82.
137. Id. at 582. The IMT, which tried major Nazi officials at Nuremberg for committing
war crimes, was based on universal jurisdiction. This tribunal system consisted of one
court in Nuremberg, which tried major Nazi officials, and courts within the four occupation
zones of post-war Germany, which tried lesser Nazis. Id.
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and are recognized by the community of nations. Such crimes
include piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft,
genocide, war crimes, and, perhaps, terrorism.3 8 The underlying
assumption is that these crimes are universally recognized and
condemned by the community of nations and that the prosecuting
nation is, therefore, acting on behalf of all nations. As a result,
Israel, or any other nation with custody of the alleged criminal,
may vindicate the interests of all nations by punishing perpetrators
of such crimes.'39 Under this international doctrine, war crimes
are viewed either as crimes against humanity, allowing Israel to
prosecute the war criminal on behalf of all nations, or crimes that
violate Israel's sovereign law and are so egregious that internation-
al law grants Israel the authority to claim jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals held that, despite the fact that the
crimes occurred in Poland, Israel was enforcing its criminal law for
the punishment of Nazis and Nazi collaborators for crimes
universally recognized and condemned, and that it, therefore, had
the right to extradite Demjanjuk. 4° Furthermore, the fact that
the state of Israel was not in existence when Demjanjuk committed
the offenses is not a bar to Israel's universal jurisdiction because,
under this doctrine, the nationality of the accused or the victim is
not significant. 1"'
Demjanjuk was charged under an Israeli statute142 that was
designed to punish those involved in carrying out Hitler's "Final
Solution., 143  Israel claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction over
crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.' 4 The perpetrators of these crimes are considered ene-
138. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 126, § 404).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 582-83.
142. Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, Aug. 1, 1950, 4 Laws St. Isr. No.
64, at 154.
143. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 581. According to Dawidowicz:
The Final Solution of the Jewish Question was the code name assigned by the
German bureaucracy to the annihilation of the Jews.... The "Jewish Question"
was, at bottom, a euphemism whose verbal neutrality concealed the user's
impatience with the singularity of this people that did not appear to conform to
the new political demands of the state .... The Final Solution transcended the
bounds of modem historical experience .... Never before in modem history had
one people made the killing of another the fulfillment of an ideology, in whose
pursuit means were identical with ends.
DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 1, at xxv-xxvii.
144. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 581.
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mies of all people, and any nation with custody may punish the
perpetrators according to its laws.145
C. Doctrine of Specialty
Demjanjuk argued that the district court did not have jurisdic-
tion to consider Israel's request for extradition because the crimes
with which he was charged were not included in the list of offenses
set forth in the treaty between the United States and Israel. The
principle of specialty provides that a person can be tried only for
the crimes on which the extradition was based.1 6 Demjanjuk
argued that, because Israel based the extradition order on murder
charges, he could not be tried under the Nazi and Nazi Collabora-
tors Law.1 47 He 'argued that the specific acts of murder in the
extradition order reduced the charge to common-law murder.
14
Specifically, Demjanjuk contended that the charge of "murder-
ing tens of thousands of Jews and non-Jews" was not covered
under the term of "murder" in the treaty.1 49 Extradition requires
that the crime for which extradition is sought be included in the
treaty between the requesting and the surrendering nation. 5 °
The court determined that "murder" included the mass murder of
Jews."' The court held that the principle of specialty does not
impose any limitation on the particulars of the charge so long as
it encompasses only the offense for which extradition was grant-
ed.1
52
The doctrine of specialty prevented the Israeli court from
retrying Demjanjuk on other charges including: serving as an SS
guard at the Trawniki training camp in Poland; serving as an SS
guard at the Sobibor death camp; and serving at two forced labor
camps. The charges in the warrant against Demjanjuk, under
which he was extradited, were based only on allegations that he
145. Id. at 582.
146. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 96.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (1985).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982); see also Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312
(1925).
151. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 579.
152. Id. at 583.
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was "Ivan the Terrible." ' 3 International law, therefore, "forbids
him from being tried on any other charges" in Israel.'- 4
Under section 216 of Israel's Criminal Procedure Law of 1982,
it is possible to convict a defendant for an offense that he is shown
to be guilty of committing even though the facts indicating his guilt
are not stated in the indictment, provided that the defendant has
been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.'55
Unfortunately, the prosecution concentrated all of its effort on
Demjanjuk's service at Treblinka, and only raised his service at
Sobibor and other concentration camps toward the end of the
hearing. The Israeli Supreme Court refused to apply section 216
in this case because Demjanjuk did not have a reasonable
opportunity to answer further allegations.56 Because the appli-
cation of section 216 would have required extending Demjanjuk's
seven year custody, Demjanjuk was not tried on charges that were
not alleged in the indictment.
IV. DEMJANJUK'S TRIAL IN ISRAEL
In April 1988, two years after Demjanjuk's extradition, the
Jerusalem district court convicted Demjanjuk of crimes against
humanity based on eyewitness testimony and documentary
evidence, including an identification card from the SS training
center at Trawniki.- 7 During the trial, the defense argued that
while Ivan the Terrible was perpetrating these atrocious crimes,
the defendant was held captive for eighteen months by the
Germans in the Chelm POW camp. 5 8 The court found that this
contention was not credible, as the accused failed to cite any
evidence describing the camp at Chelm. '9
On May 14, 1990, more than two years after Demjanjuk was
found guilty and sentenced to death by the Jerusalem district
153. Stephen Labaton, An Appeals Court States Dermjanjuk Can Return to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at Al.
154. Id.
155. RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11.
156. Id.
157. Israel v. Demjanjuk, Criminal Case (Jerusalem) 373/86 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1988).
158. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 288.
159. Id. In light of Demjanjuk's contention that he was held at the Chelm camp for a
period of eighteen months, it was surprising that he could not describe any part of the
camp or those who lived with him, when he was able to remember details of his service
in camps where he lived for a much shorter period of time. Id.
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court, Demjanjuk's appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court began."6
While this appeal was pending, Israeli prosecutors obtained
information from the former Soviet Union inculpating an operator
of the gas chambers named Ivan Marchenko as "Ivan the Terri-
ble," and, therefore, tending to exculpate Demjanjuk from those
specific crimes. 6 These Russian documents either identified
"Ivan the Terrible" as Ivan Marchenko, or placed Demjanjuk as
a guard at another death camp.162
In light of this new evidence, a panel of the U.S. Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reopened the extradition proceedings and
appointed a special master, Judge Thomas A. Weisman, Jr., to
determine whether the U.S. Government had defrauded the court
by concealing evidence relating to Marchenko 63 The Special
Master found that the government attorneys who participated in
the proceedings against Demjanjuk had "acted in good faith" and
that each of Demjanjuk's allegations of fraud was without
merit.' 6'
On July 29, 1993, Israel's Supreme Court overturned
Demjanjuk's conviction ruling that sufficient evidence existed to
cast "reasonable doubt"1 65 as to whether Demjanjuk was the
notorious Treblinka guard known as "Ivan the Terrible." 166 The
Court found that the new evidence from the former Soviet Union,
which was obtained long after the trial, contained statements of
other Treblinka guards referring to the operator of the gas
chamber at Treblinka "as another Ukrainian, Ivan Marchenko,
whose appearance, biography and record differed significantly from
160. Peter Ford, Israeli Supreme Court Overturns Conviction, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 30, 1993, at 6.
161. Alex Kozinski, The Case of Ivan Demjanjuk: Sanhedrin II: Israel's Supreme Court,
B'NAI B'RITH MESSENGER, Sept. 10, 1993, at 1, 10.
162. Id.
163. See Report of the Special Master, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435 (6th Cir.
June 30, 1993).
164. Id. at 206.
165. The Israeli Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court do not share the same
standards of proof. The Israeli Supreme Court reversed Demjanjuk's conviction and
ordered his acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt, not on the ground that there was
conclusive evidence of his "actual innocence," as the U.S. Supreme Court would require.
See Alan Dershowitz, We Would Have Executed Ivan, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 2, 1993, at
1.
166. Asher Felix Landau, The End of the Demjanjuk Case, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 20,
1993, at 1.
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what is accepted about Demjanjuk's record., 16 7 On June 8, 1992,
the prosecution's case crumbled because they could not establish
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Demjanjuk was at
Treblinka.
The Israeli Supreme Court was troubled that the trial court
had dealt primarily with the Ivan the Terrible charge, while the
Trawniki and Sobibor charges were more like afterthoughts."6
The Court held that Demjanjuk did not have a "reasonable
opportunity of defending himself properly" against these other
charges.16 9 To give Demjanjuk such an opportunity would mean
reopening the procedures, an action that the court found unreason-
able.
170
A. Evidence That Demjanjuk Was At Trawniki
At the same time that the Court admitted this new evidence
regarding Ivan Marchenko, the Israeli Supreme Court found "clear
and unequivocal evidence that Demjanjuk served as a guard at the
Trawniki training camp based on the Trawniki identification
card."1 7' Trawniki was the site of a training camp for Russian
POWs who had volunteered to act as guards to assist the Germans
in "Operation Reinhard."'72  The SS and the German police
controlled the camp. At Trawniki, the Soviet prisoners were
trained to participate in each step of the Jews' extermination: "to
serve as ghetto policemen, to liquidate ghettos, to round up Jews,
to load them into trains, to accompany the transports, and finally,
to serve in the death camps.' '173  Of the 5,000 volunteers assem-
167. Id. One problem for the defense, however, was Demjanjuk's listing of his mother's
maiden name as Marchenko when he applied for his U.S. visa. Demjanjuk's attorney
argued successfully that the choice of this name was mere chance and that "identity is the
heart of the case," while everything else is irrelevant. Black, supra note 36, at 2.
168. Kozinski, supra note 161, at 10.
169. Id.
170. Id. The Israeli Supreme Court may have acquitted Demjanjuk for many reasons,
including: (1) it may have felt that retrying Demjanjuk on the lesser charge would be
perceived as desperate, petty, and vindictive; (2) there may have been no reason to single
out Demjanjuk from among many thousands who served as concentration camp guards;
and (3) it may have thought that continuing to stir up memories of the Holocaust was not
fair to the survivors, many of whom were in their last years. Id.
171. Landau, supra note 166, at 1.
172. RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 12.
173. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 167.
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bled by the Germans at Trawniki, only 500 would be selected as
death camp guards and receive the rank "SS Wachmann."' 74
The Trawniki card stated that it was issued to someone named
Ivan Demjanjuk, and it listed his birthdate, birthplace, the name
of his father, and physical characteristics concerning the color of
his eyes, the color of his hair, and his height. 175  Demjanjuk
contended that no .such card had been issued, and that the
certificate that the prosecution relied upon was a forgery by the
K.G.B.176 To contradict this assertion, Dr. Wolfgang Sheffler, a
West German Professor and Operation Reinhard expert, testified
that "in the past twenty or twenty-five years, we have not come
across a single document that comes from Nazi sources or Nazi
files ... that would have been forged. Not a single one."'77
After considering the evidence from the experts, the appellant's
own references to the certificate, and the right of the Court to rely
on its own examination of the document, the Israeli Supreme
Court accepted the finding that the Trawniki document was
authentic.178 The Israeli Supreme Court held that "contentions
with regard to the forgery of the Trawniki certificate in the light
of the experts" testimony and in the light of the other evidence are
reduced to zero.
179
B. Evidence That Demjanjuk Was At Treblinka
The Treblinka extermination camp was located in Warsaw,
Poland, and it operated from July, 1942 until September, 1943.1'
The Trawniki identification card, coupled with witnesses who
identified Demjanjuk from photographs of guards dressed in Nazi
uniforms, gave the Israeli Government a remarkably powerful case
against Demjanjuk. By the end of the OSI's investigation, no
fewer than thirteen witnesses, including Treblinka survivors from
around the world, identified Demjanjuk's photograph as depicting
a Ukrainian guard at the death camp.'8' Eliahu Rosenberg, who
174. RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 12.
175. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 168.
176. Id. at 167.
177. Id. at 170.
178. Landau, supra note 166, at 1.
179. Id.
180. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (1981).
181. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
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spent eleven months at Treblinka, testified against Demjanjuk. l'
Rosenberg initially worked as a corpse carrier at Treblinka and
then became one of the Bandemeisters ("shower cleaners"), who
washed the gas chambers and cleaned -the ramp between extermi-
nations. 83
Rosenberg, Bourkas, Epstein and Reichman, survivors of the
concentration camps, testified that they worked near Demjanjuk
and lived in fear of his deeds.8" The Government also offered
the testimony of Otto Horn, a Nazi guard who saw Ivan after the
uprising at Treblinka,'" as well as the deposition of Ignat
Terentyevich Danylchenko, another guard who testified at the trial
that he had met Demjanjuk in March, 1943 at Sobibor and remem-
bered him as an "excellent Wachmann."' 6  Danylchenko also
testified that Demjanjuk served with him at Flossenbuerg.'8
Based on the evidence provided by eye-witnesses who had testified
about Demjanjuk's identity before the Israeli district court, or
whose statements had been admitted as evidence, the Israeli
district court found the witnesses' identification to be reliable."
According to Israeli Supreme Court Justice Menachem Elon,
who presided over Demjanjuk's case, "the decision ... has enor-
mous value in that witnesses who were within Treblinka itself
testified. Their testimony is on the record, and it's an important
182. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 122-24.
183. Id. at 123. Rosenberg testified:
When the victims were inside, the first ones did not know where they were going,
it was so very well decoyed and camouflaged.... But by the time the (gas]
chambers had filled up, I would start hearing at the other end a most ghastly
scream, crying, weeping ... the screams, the shouts were terrible. Then these
screams died down. And then I heard moaning, groans, and that, too, subsided
until it became quiet. Often I saw inside [the gas chambers] strong young
people... fighting and trying to get their heads above the others in order to get
a tiny bit of air.
Id. at 123-24.
184. TEICHOLZ, supra note 2, at 111.
185. Id. at 287. The laborers at Treblinka realized that they would be kept alive only
as long as the Nazis needed them. Thus, the Jewish leaders of the camp planned an
escape on August 2, 1943. Jews ran for the woods and swamps, but the revolt was not
successful. "Of the eight-hundred-fifty inmates ... only three-hundred-fifty to four
hundred were thought to have made it to the surrounding woods. Of those, two hundred
were apprehended and summarily shot. Of those who escaped ... only fifty survived the
war's end." Id. at 13-15.
186. Id. at 280.
187. Id. at 240.
188. Israel v. Demjanjuk, Criminal Case (Jerusalem) 373/86 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1988).
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bulwark against Holocaust-deniers."' 89 On appeal, however, the
additional statements from the former Soviet Union, inculpating
an operator of the gas chambers named Ivan Marchenko'as "Ivan
the Terrible," created reasonable doubt that Demjanjuk was the
operator of the gas chambers in the extermination camp at
Treblinka. Demjanjuk was therefore acquitted despite the eye-
witnesses' testimony.1g°
C. How the United States Would Have Tried the Case
The Israeli Supreme Court's summary of the evidence
discloses that, despite the passage of almost fifty years, the
attorney general of Israel was able to construct a remarkably
powerful case against Demjanjuk. No fewer than thirteen
witnesses identified Demjanjuk from contemporary photographs of
guards dressed in Nazi uniforms. Five witnesses identified
Demjanjuk in court as Ivan the Terrible and remained convinced
of this despite extensive cross-examinations. Our own Supreme
Court likely would have reached a different result had Demjanjuk
been prosecuted in the United States.191
Based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Herrera v.
Collins,"9 the Court probably would not have admitted the
statements of other Treblinka guards referring to the operator of
the gas chambers as Ivan Marchenko. In Herrera, the defendant
was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of two Texas
police officers. 93 In addition to eyewitness testimony, the evi-
dence introduced at trial against Herrera included his social
security card found within feet of one of the victims, his jeans and
wallet stained with blood of one victim's type, and a handwritten
letter that strongly implied that he had committed the mur-
ders. 94 In 1992, more than ten years after his trial, the defen-
dant attempted to admit exculpatory evidence that consisted of
affidavits, mostly from friends and family members, stating that
Herrera's dead brother had confessed to being the actual murder-
189. Netty C. Gross, In the Tradition of Justice, JERUSALEM POST, Feb 5, 1994, at 15.
190. Landau, supra note 166, at 1.
191. Dershowitz, supra note 165, at 1; see also Alex Kozinski, Sanhedrin II, 16 NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1993, at 16.
192. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 856.
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er.' 95 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the new evidence was
not sufficiently persuasive of Herrera's actual innocence to justify
a new trial because the government had no opportunity to cross-
examine the brother, the new evidence had been presented eight
years after Herrera's trial, and Herrera's showing of actual
innocence fell short of the threshold showing required for habeas
corpus relief.196
It is highly doubtful that an American court would have
admitted the KGB statements which ultimately exonerated
Demjanjuk had they been presented at trial, much less on appeal.
The new evidence that the Israeli Supreme Court considered
regarding Ivan Marchenko became available years after
Demjanjuk's trial.197 Furthermore, it consisted largely of hearsay
statements of dead Nazi collaborators. 98  The statements them-
selves were taken by the KGB, and the declarants were not subject
to cross-examination or impeachment t99 Therefore, there was
no way to know how these statements were produced or whether
they were authentic.2' Demjanjuk's situation, like Herrera's,
would probably be decided according to precedent, which states
that claims of actual innocence based upon newly discovered
evidence are not cognizable in federal habeas litigation.2"' To
obtain relief, Demjanjuk probably would have had to assert a
separate constitutional violation.2
Why, then, did the Israeli Supreme Court set Demjanjuk free?
The Court's decision to free Demjanjuk rests on two key rul-
ings.2"3 The first concerns the sufficiency of the evidence that
Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible. The Court held that this was
195. Id.
196. Id. at 865. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where a defendant has
been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the
constitutional presumption of innocence disappears. Because Herrera did not seek relief
from a procedural error that would allow him to bring an independent constitutional claim
challenging his conviction, but rather argued that he was entitled to habeas relief because
new evidence showed his conviction was factually incorrect, his claim was denied. Id. at
854.
197. Dershowitz, supra note 165, at 1.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Vernon E. Googe, 1II, Herrera v. Collins: Federal Habeas Corpus Review and
Claims of Actual Innocence, 27 GA. L. REV. 971 (1993).
202. Id.
203. Kozinski, supra note 191, at 16.
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not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the Court decided
not to pursue the lesser charges that Demjanjuk served as a guard
at the extermination camp at Sobibor and the concentration camps
at Flossenbuerg and Regensbuerg. The Court felt that it could not
dismiss the KGB statements and could not come up with a
satisfactory explanation for their existence.2 4 These statements
established a reasonable doubt that Demjanjuk was Ivan the
Terrible.2°0
In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted a standard
much more rigorous than that normally employed in the United
States.2 "An appellate court [in the United States] would look
at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
ask itself whether a rational jury could have convicted; it would
reverse only if the evidence absolutely required an acquittal."'
Because the KGB statements came into the record with no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarants, no proof of authentic-
ity, and nothing that would make the statements reliable enough
to be admitted under ordinary circumstances, it was impossible for
the prosecution to deal with them. Under Herrera, these state-
ments probably would not be sufficiently persuasive of
Demjanjuk's innocence in the United States. Because Congress
has categorically barred aliens who assisted in Nazi persecution
from the United States,' the judicial finding that Demjanjuk
served at the SS camp at Trawniki and the death camp at Sobibor
should be sufficient to require his exclusion from the United
States.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEMJANJUK'S RETURN ON THE
UNITED STATES ROLE IN SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTIONS OF
ALLEGED NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
Demjanjuk's acquittal raises questions about the efficacy of
pursuing suspected war criminals nearly half a century after the
event. Specifically, as the memories of aging witnesses who faced
excessive trauma fade, it becomes increasingly difficult to success-
fully prosecute Nazi war criminals. For this reason, Demjanjuk's
204. Id. at 17.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
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extradition to Israel may have been the last major trial of an
alleged Nazi war criminal.
Before 1975, no systematic effort to investigate allegations of
Nazi war criminals living in the United States existed. On March
28, 1979, Congress created the OSI. The sole purpose of the OSI
is to locate, investigate, and institute legal proceedings against Nazi
criminals in the United States.' The OSI -is part of the Crimi-
nal Prosecution Division of the U.S. Justice Department,210 has
a budget of approximately three million dollars, and has a
committed staff of historians, researchers, investigators, and
litigators.
211
Some of the OSI's critics claim that the United States should
not continue to allocate money and resources to identify, denatu-
ralize, and deport alleged Nazi war criminals who have resided in
the United States for many years as law-abiding individuals.
212
These critics support the imposition of a statute of limitations on
charges brought by the OSI.213 In essence, those who support
abolishing the OSI call for forgiveness of the perpetrators of the
Holocaust.2"4 Another argument, made in support of the aboli-
tion of the OSI, is the belief that society should forgive, forget, and
show mercy toward the perpetrators of the Holocaust.2 5 Finally,
there is a potentially high and incalculable cost to the Govern-
ment's efforts to identify and prosecute those who the Government
believes assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians.
216
Several arguments have also been advanced in support of
retaining the OSI. One argument emphasizes the special responsi-
bility of the United States for its own past acts. The United States
may have a special responsibility to locate and prosecute Nazi
criminals because the United States erred in permitting Nazi
collaborators to enter the country.2 7 By returning the defen-
209. Mausner, supra note 43, at 751.
210. Id.
211. Rena Hozore Reiss, The Extradition of John Demjanjuk: War Crimes, Universality
Jurisdiction, and the Political Offense Doctrine, 20 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 281, 286 n.22
(1987).
212. Stephen J. Massey, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting
Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REV. 97, 149 (1986).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 151.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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dants to the countries where their crimes were committed and
allowing those countries to prosecute these criminals, the United
States could make amends for concealing the perpetrators'
pasts.
218
Retributivist theories also support retaining the OSI. These
theories are based on one or more of the following premises: (1)
a person is punishable if, and only if, he or she has committed an
offense; (2) a person who has committed an offense deserves
punishment; (3) the justification for punishment is derived from
the justice of imposing on those who have committed offenses the
treatment they deserve; and (4) punishment is proper when it is
proportional to the wickedness of the offense.219 Assuming that
this retributivist framework is logical, the issue then becomes
whether the punishment the OSI imposes on Nazi war criminals in
the form of denaturalization and deportation suits is proportional
to the moral wrong of the defendants' offenses. The Nazis
uprooted Jewish families from their homes and packed them into
ghettos. From the ghettos, Jews were crowded into cattle cars.
Those Jews who survived the grueling trip, often made in freezing
cold or oppressive heat, were ultimately carried to their deaths.
Because the Nazis stripped the Jews of their citizenship, denatural-
izing and deporting those who assisted the Nazis may be an
appropriate response.'
Finally, the OSI's continued existence can be justified on the
ground that prosecuting Nazi criminals will deter others from
acting in a similar manner.22' Although the OSI has made noble
attempts to bring Nazi collaborators to justice, the record of the
U.S. Government prior to the OSI's existence is unimpressive.
Even Germany and some South American countries have done
very little to ensure that Nazis are caught and punished.222
In spite of the minimal deterrent effect that the OSI's efforts
may have, it is important to remember that Nazi war criminals
committed the crime of genocide, not murder.223 Because the
218. Id.
219. Id. at 157 n.319.
220. Id. at 159.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See ARENDT, supra note 34, at 272. Arendt notes:
These mass murderers must be prosecuted because they violated the order of
mankind, and not because they killed millions of people.... Nothing is more
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crimes of alleged Nazis transcended the bounds of moral decency,
the United States should continue to investigate and institute legal
proceedings against alleged Nazi war criminals. Simon Wiesenthal,
the legendary pursuer of Nazi war criminals, argues that criminal
justice is not the purpose of his quest. "These crimes can't really
be punished anyway. I see what I am doing as a warning to the
murderers of tomorrow. A warning to them . .. that they will
never rest in peace."224
The message communicated by the OSI's efforts to locate,
investigate and institute legal proceedings against Nazi war
criminals continues to be a powerful one. This message is
probably not capable of articulation without the OSI's continued
existence. Abolishing the OSI would suggest that the acts of Nazi
war criminals were not serious wrongs against innocent victims.
The central purpose of capturing Nazis and putting them on trial,
however, is to educate the world about the importance of fighting
evil when it first begins. The OSI's efforts forcefully and emphati-
cally communicate to Nazi war criminals and society that the
United States will not tolerate the moral injustice of the offenses
committed by Nazi war criminals.
VI. CONCLUSION
Following failed appeals to the Israeli Supreme Court to keep
Demjanjuk in Israel so he could be tried for his roles at Sobibor
and the concentration camps of Flossenbuerg and Regensbuerg,
Demjanjuk returned to his Cleveland home. Shortly after his
return to the United States, a federal appeals court dismissed the
prior extradition order.' The U.S. Justice Department, howev-
er, has reopened the legal battle against Demjanjuk. 6 The U.S.
Justice Department believes Demjanjuk should be deported
because its original case cited activities at death camps in addition
pernicious to an understanding of these new crimes.. . than the common illusion
that the crime of murder and the crime of genocide are essentially the same, and
that the latter therefore is no new crime properly speaking. The point of the
latter is that an altogether different order is broken and an altogether different
community is violated.
Id. at 272.
224. Jordan Bonfante, Where Have All the Nazis Gone?, TIME, Aug. 9, 1993, at 38.
225. See generally Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993).
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at 16.
1994]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
to his service at Treblinka. 227 Two motions have been filed in
Ohio federal courts. In one motion, the Justice Department is
appealing a court.order overturning his extradition to. Israel. In
the other motion, the Justice Department seeks to reopen the
original denaturalization proceedings.'
In spite of the pending denaturalization and deportation
proceedings, the evidence heard in Demjanjuk's case, publicized
throughout the nation, remains unanswerable, stark, and extremely
convincing. Trials of alleged Nazi war criminals are often intended
as a lesson or reminder for those too young to remember the
Holocaust. Despite the obstacles in prosecuting crimes that
occurred almost fifty years ago, far away from the United States,
Nazi criminals in the United States should be brought to justice.
Considering that the OSI was not created until 1979, more than
thirty years after more than six million Jews and millions of other
innocent people were murdered during World War II, the OSI
continues to make up for the lost time in bringing war criminals to
justice.
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227. Id. Attorney General Janet Reno has stated that the U.S. Justice Department's
objective is to bring about Demjanjuk's prompt removal from the United States. "We
want there to be no doubt that Mr. Demjanjuk served in [N]azi death camps and
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